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Defense Expenditures, Allocations 
For Development and Debt Servicing: 
An Analysis of Pakistani Budgetary 
Priorities, 1976-1992 
Robert E. Looney 
In Pakistan, allocations to the military account for nearly one 
third of the government expenditur<is. While common sense 
suggests that the country's high military burdens have largely 
retarded allocations to development, there may be other budgetary 
items that have produced a similar effect. In particular the country's 
rising indebtedness is now forcing the government to commit ever 
increasing shares of the budget to debt servicing. Because of its 
rising share of the budget interest payments may have had an even 
stronger negative influence on economic allocations than that 
associated with increased defense burdens. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine these possibilities. Have 
allocations to defense come largely at the expense of development? 
Do increased defense expenditures systematically reduce the share 
of the budget received by other major expenditure categories? What 
types of defense expenditures affect the strongest-anticipated 
increases or those that were unplanned? Do budget deficits offset 
some potentially negative impacts that increased defense 
expenditures might entail? What other budgetary categories appear 
to impact negatively on allocations to development? 
Robert E. Looney is a professor of National Security Affairs at the 
Naval Postgraduate school, Monterey, California. He has written 
eighteen books on various aspects of economic deve~opment 
together with articles appearing in journal of South Asian .and 
Middle Eastern Studies, journal of Energy and Developr:ient, Mtd~le 
Eastern Studies, Orient, OPEC Review and Iranian Studies. 




In Pakistani1 as indicated in Pakistan, Afghanistan Country 
Profile, 1992-93 (London: EIU, 1993), pp. 37-40. The federal budget 
has two main parts· - the ordinary budget covering current 
expt!nditure and the development budget or Public Sector 
Development Programme (PSDP) which covers capital investment 
and development programs. Some federal income is passed on as 
statutory and discretionary grants to the provinces, which have their 
own budgets and also raise some of their own resources. 
In recent years current expenditures have averaged round 65-75 
percent of expenditures. The proportion of spending devoted to 
social items is low and as noted above is under pressure from the 
· demands of defense and debt servicing which together accounted 
for 80 percent of current expenditure in the 1992/93 budget. The 
PSDP has regularly been revised downwards in light both of 
reduced flows of foreign aid on which it depends heavily and of 
local resources. 
The 1987 /88 budget initially provided for substantial increases in 
taxes and administered prices to reduce the size of the resources 
gap. Widespread protests forced the government to rescind most of 
the increases and a revised budget was issued in which cuts were 
made in both current and development expenditure. The 1988/89 
budget, produced by a caretaker government made only limited 
changes to tax and expenditure levels. The result was a substantial 
fiscal deficit. At this time the budget tried to introduce significant 
measures to reduce tax evasion by the business and trading classes, 
but these had to be watered down in the face of opposition. 
The 1989/90 and 1990/91 budgets introduced by the PPP 
government were cautious on both the fiscal and expenditure sides. 
Mr. Nawaz Sharif's first budget projected increases in current 
expenditure of only 8.1 · percent in 1991/92. The largest increases 
were scheduled for spending on defense (11.6 percent) and debt 
servicing (26.5 percent) and subsidies were cut. Despite reducing 
the maximum rate of income tax, the government expected an 
increase in revenue to reduce the fiscal deficit to 5 percent of GNP 
compared with 5.8 percent in 1990/91. In the event the resources 
gap (die deficit after utilization of external funds) was revised 
upwards to three times that originally envisaged, because of 
1 The following draws heavily on: Pakistan, Afghanistan Country Profile, 
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unanticipated spending increases while internal receipts were 
expected to fall short. 
The budget for 1992/93 projects a modest increase in spending 
with both subsidies and development spending scheduled to fall, 
while tax revenue is expected to rise, although below the rates 
originally projected for 1991/92. As a result the resources gap is 
forecast to narrow. 
The successive deficits reflect the fragility of the resource base 
that underpins the budget. Tax collections have historically 
represented a low proportion of GDP and continue to do so; total 
tax revenues were 13.3 percent of GDP in 1980/81 and were at the 
same level in 1991/92. Moreover, indirect taxes were over-
whelmingly the main source of revenue. Evasion of income and 
corruption tax is widespread and the agricultural sector is totally 
exempt from income tax. 
In a three year (1991/92-1993/94) macroeconomic and structural 
adjustment policy framework paper circulated to the World Bank 
and IMF in December 1991 the government committed itself to a 
major overhaul of the fiscal system. The objectives include 
improving the structure of taxation, by extending the narrow base 
of both direct and indirect taxes, making it more equitable and 
elastic, and by taking administrative measures to increase receipts 
of income and wealth taxes and general sales taxes and federal 
excise taxes as a proportion of GDP. 
The Economics of Austerity 
Clearly until these reforms are in place the country will continue 
to operate as it has in the past under severe budgetary constraint 
with cuts likely in the more vulnerable sections of the budget. 
Intuitively, one might expect the analysis of budgetary tradeoffs 
between defense and allocations to socioeconomic programs to be 
fairly straightforward. That is a given budgetary increase in military 
expenditure will crowd out an equivalent amount of all other 
spending, and these programs will be reduced according to their 
proportion of the total. However recent research has shown that 
this view of the budgetary process is simplistic and does not 
conform with the manner in which governments often chose to 
prioritize expenditures. 2 
2 See for example Saadet Deger, "Human Resources, Government Education 
Expenditure and the Military Burden in Less Developed Countries," journal of 
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A related issue is the manner in which austerity-driven budgetary 
cuts are allocated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that officials often 
follow rather ad hoc rules for making large contractions in a short 
time - cutting new rather than ongoing projects, new rather than 
present employment, and materials and travel expenses rather than 
personal; and favoring Ministries that are politically powerful, or 
reducing those that have expanded most rapidly in the past.3 
Operationally, several methods have been used to establish 
whether tradeoffs exist. 4 First, using cross-section data it should be 
possible to discern whether relatively big spenders on the military 
are small spenders in areas such as education and health (and vice 
versa). Recently a study by Harris, Kelly and Pranowo found: 
1. Based on one year's data (1983), countries that allocate 
relatively high proportions of their central government 
expenditure (CGE) to defense do not commonly allocate 
relatively low proportions to education and health (and the 
converse applies). 
2. Defense expenditure has a low vulnerability during times of 
general CGE cuts, but so do health and education 
expenditures. If anything, defense is more vulnerable than the 
other two, particularly in low income countries. 
3. During times of CGE expansion, defense expenditure in low 
income countries expands at a rate comparable with 
education and somewhat more than health. Jn middle income 
countries, health expenditures increase more proportionally 
than defense and education. 
4. For 12 Asian countries between 1967 and 1983, multiple 
regression analysis confirmed that tradeoffs between defense 
expenditure and education/health were rare.5 
Second, and again following Harris, the effect of central govern-
ment expenditure increases or cutbacks on, say, defense, health, and 
education allocations may be examined. If a tradeoff existed, it might 
3 Cf. the discussion in N. Caiden and A. Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in 
Poor Countries, (New York: John Wiley, 1974). 
4 Th~ follo~ing draw~ heavily on G.T. Harris, "Economic Aspects of Military 
Expenditures m Developing Countries: A Survey Article," Contemporary Southeast 
Asia (June 1988), pp. 95-96. 
5 Goffrcy Harris, Mark Kelly and Pranowo, "Tradeoffs Between Defense and 
Education/Health Expenditures in Developing Countries," journal of Peace 
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be expected that defense expenditure would gain with respect to 
other expenditure categories during years of CGE cutbacks. 
As to the choice of which sectors to cut back, it is often felt that 
some sectors are more "vulnerable" than others. The defense sector, 
particularly, is usually considered difficult to reduce, while social 
sectors, such as health, education and rural development, are 
considered vulnerable. The alleged vulnerability of the social sector 
in developing countries is evident in World Bank documents: 
In the difficult past few years, budgetary crises have often 
meant that social services were cut back, in the process 
unraveling carefully designed programs.6 
Since many human development programs are publicly 
funded, they are especially vulnerable when growth is 
threatened and budgets are under pressure. The recurrent 
costs of social programs, especialty•salary cuts, tended to make 
them a permanent and, therefore, vulnerable part of 
Government budgets.7 
'Quick Fix' relief through disproportionate cutbacks - in, for 
example, education or rural development - may well have 
negative consequences for the entire economy.8 
Many member countries have had to reduce and reorient 
investment programs to curtail recurrent expenditure and to 
delay the completion of high priority developments projects. 
Programs in health, education and other social sectors have 
been particularly vulnerable.9 
In the crisis situations confronting African Governments, 
education, training and health programs are continuously in 
danger of becoming the residual legatees of both resources and 
attention by policy makers.10 
6 IDA in Retrospect (Washington: World Bank, 1983), p. 52. 
7 The World Bank, World Development Report, 1981 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), pp. 97-98. 
8 Focus on Poverly, 1983 (Washington: World Bank, 1983), p. 5. 
9 World.Bank Program on Special Assistance to Member Countries (Washington: 
World Bank, 1984), p. 1. 
10 Suh-Saharan Africa: Progress Reporl on Development Prospects and Programs 
(Washington: World Bank, 1983), p. 30. See also Robert McKinlay, Third World 
Military ExfJenditure: Determinants and lmDlicatio11s (London: Fr:inrPs Pinrn 1 CJRCJ) 
In the first comprehensive study of relative vulnerability Kicks 
and Kubisch examined 37 cases of budgetary reductions. These 
were defined as occurring in countries where real expenditure 
declined in one or more years. According to Hicks and Kubisch, a 
sector was defined as: 
Well-protected, if expenditure on it was reduced by less than 
the percentage reduction in total expenditures. 
Vulnerable, if its percentage of reduction exceeded the average. 
In brief, a simple ratio of percentage change in each sector's 
expenditure relative to total spending served as the measure of 
vulnerability. Where the ratio had a greater value than one, it 
suggested that the sector was highly vulnerable; a value between 
zero and one suggested low vulnerability, with less than 
proportional reduction in the relative sector. A negative value 
showed that, despite general expenditure reductions, the sector 
was allowed to expand. 
Hicks and Kubisch's main findings suggest that the countries 
examined experienced an average decline of 13 percent in real 
Government expenditure. Associated with this decline was a 
contraction of only five percent in the social sectors (producing a 
vulnerability index of 0.4). By contrast, the index was 0.6 for the 
administrative/defense sectors and over one percent for production 
and infrastructure. In short, the various social sectors were less 
vulnerable to cuts than defense and administration, which in turn 
were considerably less vulnerable than production and infra-
structure. This pattern is contrary to the generally accepted view. 
The fact that social sectors and defense were both relatively 
protected suggests that there were high political costs associated 
with reducing them. On the other hand, countries appeared to 
have been more willing to cut spending on infrastructure and 
prqduction that, of course, are likely to have adverse implications 
for longer term growth, but few early, direct and immediate costs. 
This picture was confirmed by Mckinlay who found that there 
was no evidence that Third World military expenditures are 
responsive to government financial constraints of a short or long 
term v~riety: "In this respect, th~n, we infer that military expenditure 
has a life largely independent of central financial constraints, indi-
cative therefore on its part of a substantial degree of autonomy." 11 
11 Mrl<inl•iu r..h rit - 2.C:: 
Regarding budgetary prionttes, McKinlay found that while a 
substantial commitment was made by Third World countries to the 
growth and expansion of education and health expenditure, that 
commitment was not nearly as high as in the area of military 
expenditure. In this respect military expenditure was generally 
taken to be a higher priority. 
Finally McKinlay found that Third World countries as a whole 
move their education and health expenditures in a much narrower 
band than their allocations to defense. He found that military 
expenditure had greater independence or autonomy of movement. 
The greater harmony or synchronization between budget size and 
education/health expenditures could not be explained in terms of 
the size of education/health as opposed to military expenditures. 
From this he concluded: 
We are inclined to the argument t'bat the lower level of 
synchronization of military expenditure with the budget is a' 
reflection of the greater independence of military expenditure. 
Third World governments are more inclined to move education 
and health expenditures in line with general budget expan-
sions and contractions. This leads us to infer that education-
health expenditure is a rather more stable component of 
general government expenditure than military expenditure, 
which though of course ultimately entirely constrained by 
budget expenditure does show greater freedom or latitude in its 
movement ... Although military expenditures do seem to attract 
some special priority and enjoy a greater degree of autonomy, 
our conclusion suggests that military expenditure is not 
detrimental to education or health expenditures. 12 
Similarly De Masi and Lorie found that military spending in 
developing countries has tended to exhibit resilience during 
adjustment programs that have emphasized fiscal tightening, 
particularly in cases were the program levels of expenditure were 
below average. 13 The authors warn however that: 
In adjustment programs that were accompanied by fiscal 
accommodation, the evidence suggests that the non-military 
sector tends to be given priority in the allocation of additional 
12 McKinlay, op. cit., p. 37. 
13 Paula de Masi and Henri Lorie "How Resilient are Military Expenditures?" 
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resources. Both the scarcity and uncertain quality of data, 
however, mean that the above conclusions must be interpreted 
with great caution. 14 
In a related study Harris and Kusi found that in the African 
context, countries involved with the IMF were more likely to cut 
defense expenditures than those who were not undergoing the 
Fund's stabilization programs: "Possibly the economic weakness 
that drove some countries to the IMF also caused them to cut 
military expenditures."15 
Based on data for Venezuela between 1950 and 1983, it appears 
that defense expenditure was reduced by far less than total central 
government expenditures (CGE) in the six years when general real 
CGE fell. 16 
Finally, in their examination of defense/education tradeoffs, Hess 
and Mullan found that: 
1. An increase of 1 percent in the average annual growth rate 
in per capita real GNP from 1960 to 1982 was associated with 
an increase of from 0.5 to 0.8 percent in the military burden. 
2. Significant political violence since 1960 was associated with 
an increase of from 1.8 to 2.8 percent in the military burden. 
3. North African and Middle Eastern nations spent significantly 
more of GNP on the military (from 2.5 to 4.6 percent more). 
4. A rise of 1 percent in the military burden was associated 
with an increase of from 0.2 to 0.4 percent in the share of GNP 
going for public expenditures in education. 
5. Military controlled governments spent 0. 7 to 0.8 percent less 
of GNP on public education. 
6. Mineral rich nations used 0.8 to 0.9 percent more of GNP 
for public expenditures on education. 17 
14 De Masi and Lorie, op. cit., p. 159. See also Geoff Harris and Newman Kusi, 
"The Impact of the IMF on Government Expenditures: A Study of African LDCs" 
journal of International Development (1992), pp. 73-85. 
15 Harris fod Kusi, op. cit., p. 73. 
16 Robert E. Looney "Austerity and Military Expenditure in Developing Contraries: 
The Case of Venezuela" Socio-Economic Planning Sciences (1986), pp. 161-64. 
17 Peter Hess and Brendan Mullan, "The Military Burden and Public Education 
Expenditures in Contemporary Developing Nations: is there a Tradeoft? journal of 
/Unwlnhinn .4ro.nc-(h1lu lQAA) nn Li()7_c;.1.& 
Again following Harris scheme a third method of examining 
budgetary tradeoffs involves the use of time series data. 1H For 
example, education expenditure as a proportion of CGE (as the 
dependent variable) could be regressed against other variables 
including defense expenditure as a proportion of CGE. A significant 
negative coefficient would provide support for the view that 
a tradeoff existed. That is it "suggests that a rise (fall) in the 
defense expenditure causes a fall (rise) in the education 
expenditure variable." 19 
Here several studies have come up with rather inconclusive 
results. In the first study, Vene examined 18 Latin American 
countries between 1948 and 1979, while in a second Harris, et al 
examined twelve Asian countries between 1967 and 1982. 20 In 
neither case was there evidence of important tradeoff s between 
education/health and defense expenditure. • 
Of the 24 possible tradeoffs between defense/education and 
defense/health for the twelve Asian countries only four negative 
tradeoffi were identified. Of the remaining, twenty-nine had 
positive relationships and eleven indicated no relationship.21 
This same general pattern appears to exist in the UAE where 
defense has not expanded its share of the budget at the expense 
of education. 22 Instead the observed decline in the educational 
share of the budget in recent years appears to be more related to 
general budgetary considerations than any explicit set of priorities 
involving defense. 
Broadening the analysis to include budgetary tradeoffs between 
defense and all other budgetary categories Looney found that in 
the case of Latin American countries (roughly over the period 
1970-1983) that: 
18 G.T. Harris, "Economic Aspects of Military Expenditure in Developing 
Countries: A Survey Article" op. cit. 
19 Harris, op. cit., p. 96. 
20 Joel Vener, "Budgetary Trade-offs between Education and Defense in Latin 
America: A Research Note" journal of Developing Areas (October 1982), pp. 77-92. 
Also G. Harris, M. Kelley & Pranowo, "Tradeoffs Between Defense and 
Education/Health Expenditures in Developing Countries," op. cit. 
21 Harris, op. cit., p. 96. 
22 Robert E. Looney, "Human Capital Development in the UAE" analysis of 
Budgetary Conflicts in an Era of Relative Austerity" Public Budgeting and 
~ ,,. I • 1n •.n. ..... 'I. 
1. Those countries with negative tradeoffs appear to have them 
for all the social expenditures - public seroices, education and 
social security welfare. Thus with the exception of a positive 
tradeoff in Chile between defense and health, all the 
statistically significant tradeoffs for Venezuela, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, 
and El Salvador were negative between this category of 
government expenditures and defense. 
2. With the exception of a negative tradeoff for Costa Rica 
between defense and health, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Costa Rica all had positive tradeoffs between defense and 
public seroices, education, health and social security, welfare. 
3. Countries that tended to have negative tradeoffs between 
defense and social seroices (public seroices, education, health, 
social security-welfare) tended (with the exception of Chile) to 
have a positive tradeoff with economic seroices.23 
A closer examination of the Latin American countries reveals that 
(leaving out El Salvador because of its civil war during most of this 
period) they fall into two general groups: (Venezuela, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Peru) -
and - (2) Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Costa Rica. Each group 
has one common element - whether or not it was an arms 
producer. Countries that experienced negative tradeoffs between 
defense expenditures and social welfare expenditures tended to be 
the arms producers. Those countries that experience positive 
relationships between defense and social expenditures tended to be 
the non-arms producers. 
This finding suggests some modification of the Hicks Kubisch 
thesis may be necessary. Apparently, there is pressure on the 
governments of arms producing industries to maintain and expand 
supporting economic facilities and infrastructure as defense 
expenditures (and the local industrial component) increase. 
23 Robert E. Looney, "Military Expenditures in Latin America: Patterns of 
Budgetary Tradeoffs" journal of Economic Development (July 1986), pp. 69-103. 
Also Saudi Arabia was not included in the present study because its data is not 
strictly compatible with that of the other countries examined - the country does 
not publish its budget in the International Monetary Fund Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook. The country's budgetary published in the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency, Annual Report includes some categories not used by the 
Y-o.------•~--- .I ... ____ .. _____ ~ I 
A recent examination of Saudi Arabians budgetary priorities 
estimated a model of the form: 
SHARE = [DEFENSE(?), AFS( + ), UFS(?)] where: 
SHARE = the share of government expenditures budgeted for 
major categories of expenditure 
AFS = the actual fiscal surplus (as a share of government 
expenditures) during the current budgetary year. 
UFS = the unexpected fiscal surplus (as a share of government 
expenditures) during the current budgetary year. The 
unexpected fiscal surplus was defined as 'the difference 
between actual revenues and expenditures and budgeted 
revenues and expenditures.24 
This formulation facilitated the direct tradeoff between defense 
expenditures and other budgetary categrnies, while at the same 
time controlling for any possible austerity affects associated with 
the government's short run fiscal position. The main findings from 
this analysis were that: 
J. Jn the Saudi Arabian context, defense expenditures appear 
to be quite complementary with increased allocations to human 
resource development. In fact, of the various government 
budgetary categories, the link to human resource development 
was the strongest associated with defense expenditures. 
2. Defense expenditures were also complementary with 
allocations to health. 
3. The major negative budgetary tradeo.ffs involving defense 
were concentrated in the economic areas: (a) transportation 
and communications, (b) economic resource development 
and, to a much lesser extent, (c) infrastrncture. 
4. Defense expenditures also tended to come at the expense 
of a number of administrative allocations including 
(a) payments to municipalities, and (b) subsidies for 
government lending institutions. 
5. On the other band, areas such as general administration 
and the direct government subsidies program (largely 
agriculture) did not suffer a reduction in their relative share of 
the government budget stemming from the government's 
commitment to high levels of military expenditure. 
24 Robert E. Looney "Deducing Budgetary Priorities in Saudi Arabia: The Impa~t 
of Defense Expenditures on Allocations to Socio-Economic Programs Public 
Budgeting and Financial Management 0992), pp. 311-326. 
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From these patterns it was concluded that while defense has 
retained its leading share of the budget during a period of relative 
fiscal austerity, the country does not appear to have fallen into a 
guns versus education dilemma. In fact, the two types of 
expendirure appear to compliment each other in the minds of the 
Saudi budgetary authorities. While not as complementary, 
education and defense do not appear to have competed for 
resources in Iran during the same period. 25 
Summing up these recent studies, Hicks and Kubisch found that 
governments consider a wide range of factors when faced with 
difficult choices in reducing public expenditures. These include 
political and economic costs, present versus future consumption 
and the potential impact on employment, distribution and welfare. 
Their empirical results suggest that when governments in 
developing countries implement austerity programs, they do not 
apply across-the-board reductions in expenditures. Generally, 
capital expenditures are reduced more than recurrent expenditures. 
Within both capital and current budgets, the social and 
administrative/defense sectors appear to be relatively protected, 
while infrastructure and production absorb disproportionately larger 
reductions. That social sectors do not appear to be highly 
vulnerable to expenditure reductions in times of austerity was the 
novel finding of that study. 
Subsequent to Hicks and Kubisch's study several additional 
patterns have been identified. Without necessarily making a 
distinction as to current versus capital expenditures, these studies 
suggest that these countries tend to make selective cut in non-
defense categories, focusing either on social or economic programs. 
These patterns are further modified by the manner in which 
countries choose to selectively fund high priority sectors through 
running larger fiscal deficits. 
This pattern was found to be present in several arms producing 
countries where a fairly close link exists between the government 
budget deficit, public consumption and military expenditures. 
These countries show defense expenditures linked to budgetary 
deficits. That is defense expenditures often increase along with 
government•deficits. Other expenditures may be cut back during 
25 Robert E. Looney "War Revolution, and the Maintenance of Human Capital: 
An Analysis of Iranian Budgetary Priorities" Journal of South Asian and Middle 
t.'astern Studies(Fall 1991), pp. 1-17. 
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periods of high deficits. With budgetary surpluses, defense 
expenditures often decline in percentage terms. 26 
The next section attempts to identify the differential budgetary 
effect in the Middle East. That is, do sub-groups of countries tend 
to respond differently and selectively in cutting economic or social 
programs as defense expenditures increase their share of the 
central government budget? If this is correct, what are the common 
characteristics of these groups of countries? How are these patterns 
of budgetary tradeoff modified by the willingness or unwillingness 
to run higher fiscal deficits? 
Operational Methods 
Drawing on a model developed for Saudi Arabia, equations of 
the form: 
SHARE = flDEFTSE, DEFTSU, MILXSU, MtLXSE] 
were estimated. 
Here: 
DEFI'SE = the expected government budgetary position (- = 
DEFI'SU = the unexpected government budgetary position 
MILXSU = Unexpected defense expenditures. 
MILXSE =Expected defense expenditures.27 
In subsequent analysis similar terms for development 
expenditures and interest payments were used in place of the 
defense variables. All the variables are defined in terms of their 
share of government expenditures. 
In this formulation, we assume the expected deficit reflects a 
structural imbalance between revenue and expenditure. Similarly, 
transitory Government deficits are assumed to be depicted by that 
component of the public deficit that was unanticipated. Admittedly, 
this may occur because of a revenue shortfall. In those circum-
stances, however, the expected deficit could be attained simply by 
26 Robert E. Looney, "Military Expenditures in Latin America: Patterns of 
Budgetary Tradeoffs" op. cit., p. 101. 
27 Expected values were estimated by regressing each years actual figure on that 
of the previous year. The predicted value for each year was assumed to he that 
expected. Unexpected values were calculated as the difference between what 
actually occurred in a given year and that which was expect.ed. See Robert Looney 
"Budgetary Priorities in Saudi Arabia: The Impact of Relattve Austerity Measures 
on Human Capital Formation" OPEC Review (Summer 1991), pp. 133-152 for a 
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cutting expenditures accordingly. If an unanticipated deficit occurs, 
therefore it is assumed that it reflects the decision to fund priority 
sectors. Similarly, if a sector's budgetary share falls with an increase 
in the unanticipated deficit, it is assumed that sector's funding was 
reduced to support other programs of a higher priority. 
This f 6rm of prioritizing is consistent with (although not proof 
oO some form of lexicographic ordering of budgetary priorities. 28 
'That is, the Government acts as if it attempts to maintain certain 
budgetary categories at pre-defined levels. When these levels are 
met, the authorities are then willing to provide additional funding 
for categories and programs of lower priority. The expected and 
unexpected military expenditure terms can be interpreted in a 
similar manner. 
Two sets of regressions were estimated: The first of the form 
noted above, reflects short run budgetary adjustment to changes in 
the deficit and defense expenditures. The second set examines 
longer term budgetary adjustment to year-to year changes in the 
deficit position and military shares. These longer term adjustments 
are assumed to follow a distributed lag and thus were estimated by 
including the lagged value of the dependent variable as one of the 
regressors. 29 
In the case of defense, several patterns (Tables 1 and 2) stand out: 
1. For the short run (Table 1), there do not appear to be any 
budgetary conflicts between defense and interest payments. 
That is increases in the expected budgetary share of the 
military impact positively on the share devoted to interest 
payments. Unexpected increases in the deficit however create 
pressure to reduce interest payments. 
2. 1be picture concerning subsidies is somewhat mixed: on the 
one hand increases in both the expected and unexpected share 
of the budget allocated to defense reduce allocations to these 
act(vities. On the other hand, subsidies are funded in part 
through larger fiscal deficits. Here increases in both the 
28 Cf. J. Encarnacion, "Some Implications of Lexicographic Utility in 
Development _Planning" The Philippine Economic journal (Second Semester, 
1970), pp. 231-240. 
29 First formulated in L.M Koyc, Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis 
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1954). See M. Nerlove, "Lags in Economic Behavior" 
Econometrica (1972, pp. 221-251 for the economic interpretation of this 
phenomenon. 
expected and unexpected deficits are used to expand this 
category's budgetary share. Jn this regard, unexpected deficits 
have a somewhat greater impact. 
3. Administrative categories of the budget are not directly 
affected by changes in defense. There is however a weak 
tendency for the government to increase the expected size of 
the deficit. 
4. Defense expenditures do not increase at the expense of 
payments to social security and welfare. Both increases in the 
expected and unexpected shares of the budget increase the size 
of the budgetary share received by social security and welfare. 
On the other hand unexpected increases in the fiscal deficit 
cause reductions in allocations to these activities. 
5. Other (current) expenditures arf reduced somewhat by 
unexpected increases in defense. Ibis is offset somewhat by the 
government running a deficit somewhat larger than anti-
cipated. 1bere is also a weak positive link between increases in 
the expected deficit and funding for these activities. 
6. Finally the negative relationship between defense and 
development is again confirmed. Increases in the expected 
share of the budget allocated to defense take a heavy tool on 
development expenditures. Development also suffers during 
periods of increasing deficits (both expected and unexpected). 
In summary, the strongest relationship between defense and 
other budgetary items is the large negative impact on development 
expenditures. However, at the same time the government is 
expanding the expected share of defense, unexpected increases in 




Pakistan: Key Budgetary 
Tradeoffs Involving Defense, 1976-1992 - Short Run Impacts 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Interest lNTS (budgetary share of interest payments) 
( l) INTS = 0.23 DEITSE - 0.55 DEITSU + 0.86 MILXSE - 0.o7 MILXSU 
(1.51) (-3.21)•.. (5.IO)••• (-0.44) 
r'(adj) = 0.629; F = 7.36; DW = 1.80 
Subsidies SUBS (budgetary share of subsidies) 
(2) SUBS = 0.31 DEITSE + 0.48 DEFTSU - 0.57 MILXSE - 0.41 MILXSU 
(2.40)•• (3.33)••• (-4.11)••• (-3.06)••• 
r'(adj) = 0.745; F = 11.95; DW = 2.08 
Administration ADMS (budgetary share of administrative allocations) 
(3) ADMS = 0.48 DEITSE + 0.423 DEITSU + 0.05 MILXSE + 0.36 MILXSU 
(2.03)0 (0.87) (0.19) (1.44) 
r'(adj) = 0.153; F = 1.67; DW = 2.13 
Social Security SSTS (budgetary share of social security expenditures) 
(4) SSTS = 0.22 DEFTSE - 0.58 DEITSU + 0.74 MILXSE + 0.32 MILXSU 
0.78) (-4.32)0 •• (5.60)••• (2.57)00 
r'(adj) = 0.774; F = 13.84; DW = 1.89 
Other Current Items OTS (budgetary share of other current expenditures) 
(4) OTS = -0.83 DEITSE + 1.14 DEITSU - O.oI MILXSE - 0.65 MILXSU 
(-1.90)0 (4.31)0 •• (-0.01) (-2.64)00 
r'(adj) = 0.374; F = 3.09; DW = 2.20: -0.60 'rho1 (-2.94)00 
Development DEVS (budgetary share of development expenditures) 
(6) DEVS = -0.37 DEITSE - 0.44 DEITSU - 1.13 MILXSE + 0.19 MILXSU 
(-4.42)000 (-4.54)... (-13.40)000 (1.81) 
r'(adj) - 0.833; F = 18.51; DW = 2.30;-0.58 'rho1 (2.80)" 
Notes: Data from: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey (Islamabad: 
Finance Division, Economic Adviser's Wing) various issues. Estimation procedure 
used was ordinary least squares with a Cochraine-Orcutt correction factor for first 
and second degree aucocorrelation of the residuals. See: SORITEC Integrated 
Economet1,"ic and Statistical Analysis Language, Ver.5ion 6.6 Reference Manual, 
(Springfield, VA: Sorites Group, Inc., 1993); r'(adj) • adjusted coefficient of 
determination; F - F statistic; DW - Durbin Watson Statistic; 'rho1 • first order 
serial correlation correction factor; ( ) t test of statistical significance with: ••• 
significant at the 99% level, •• significant at the 95% level and • significant at the 
90% level. Variables ending in E are expected values; Variables ending in U are 
unexpected va.Jues - DEITSE = the expected deficit as a share of government 
expenditures; DEFTSU = the unexpected deficit as a share of government 
expenditures; MILXSE = expected military expenditures; MILXSU = unexpected 
military expenditures. 
Table 2 
Pakistan: Key Budgetary 
Tradeoffs Involving Defense, 1976-1992- Long Run Impacts 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Interest INTS (budgetary share of interest payments) 
INTS = 0.94 INTSL + 0.37 DEITSE - 0.18 DEITSU + 0.36 MILXSE + 0.22 MILXSU 
(8.05)".. (0.82) (-0.42) (0.72) (0.80) 
r'(adj) = 0.949; F = 53.50; =0.47 -rho (-2.06)•• 
Subsidies SUBS (budgetary share of subsidies) 
SUBS = -0.06 SUBSL + 0.32 DEITSE + 0.48 DEITSU - 0.62 MILXSE - 0.42 MILXSU 
(-0.22) (2.24).. (3.1 6)•• (-2.43)•• (.2.85)•• 
r'(adj) = 0.721; F = 8.75 
Administration ADMS (budgetary share of administrative allocations) 
ADMS = -0.26 ADMSL + 0.60 DEFTSE + 0.28 DEFTSU + 0.11 MILXSE + 0.34 MILXSU 
(-0.91) (2.21)•• (1.03) (0.42) (1.38) 
r'(adj) = 0.140; F = 0.27 
Social Security SSTS (budgetary share of social security expenditures) 
SSTS = 0.61 SSTSL + 0.80 DEITSE - 0.90 DEFTSU + 0.41 MILXSE + 0.31 MILXSU 
(3.25)... (1 .77)* (-2.63)'" (0.82) (1.33) 
r'(adj) = 0.879; F = 22.87 
Other Current Items OTS (budgetary share of other current expenditures) 
OT5 = -0.06 OTSL - 0.43 DEITSE + 1.13 DEITSU + 0.02 MILXSE - 0.61 MILXSU 
(-0.19) (-1.29) (3.04) (0.10) (-2.53)•• 
r'(adj) = 0.565; F = 4.38; -0.78 -rho1; -0.46 -rho2 
Development DEVS (budgetary share of development expenditures) 
DEVS = 0.49 DEVSL - 1.23 DEFTSE + 0.73 DEITSU - 2.94 MILXSE + 0.19 MILXSU 
(3.10)••• (-1.12) (1.06) (-3.09)•• (0.43) 
r'(adj) = 0.909; F = 29.26; -0.53 -rho1 (-2.44) 
Notes: Data from: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey (Islamabad: 
Finance Division, Economic Adviser's Wing) various issues. Estimation procedure 
used was ordinary least squares with a Cochraine-Orcutt correction factor for first 
and second degree autocorrelation of the residuals. See: SORITEC Integrated 
Econometric and Statistical Analysis Language, Version 6.6 Reference Manual, 
(Spfingfield, VA: Sorites Group, Inc., 1993); r'(adj) = adjusted coefficient of 
determination; F = F statistic; DW = Durbin Watson Statistic; -rho1 = first order 
serial correlation correction' factor; -rho2 = first order serial correlation correction 
factor; ( ) t test of statistical significance with: ••• significant at the 990/o level, •• 
significant at the 95% level and • significant at the 90% level. Variables ending in E 
are expected values; variables ending in U are unexpected values - DEITSE = the 
expected deficit as a share of government expenditures; DEFTSU = the 
unexpected deficit as a share of government expenditures. MILXSE = expected 
military expenditures; MILXSU = unexpected military expenditures. Variables 
ending in L are values lagged one year. 
Regarding the longer term budgetary impacts of defense (Table 2) 
.several notable patterns occur: 
1. Three budgetary categories - interest payments, social 
security/welfare and development exhibit long rnn distributed 
lqg adjustment patterns. Tbat is for these items in the budget 
short run shocks cause a period of budgetary adjustment 
extending into the future. 
2. In the longer rnn, allocations to interest payments appear to 
be independent of changes in the deficit (both expected and 
unexpected). Also there is no apparent long rnn impact on 
these allocations stemming form changes in the defense budget. 
3. On the other hand, defense continues over the longer term to 
have a negative impact on subsidies. As in the short rnn, the 
effects of defense are blunted somewhat by the government's 
willingness to expand the deficit to fund these programs. Here 
both increases in the expected and unanticipated deficits tend 
to augment the amount of funds earmarked for these activities. 
4. As in the short rnn, administrative categories in the budget 
are somewhat immune from changes in the government's 
fiscal position and its decision to expand defense expenditures. 
Increases in the expected deficit still help maintain these expen-
ditures, however as in the short rnn this effect is rather weak. 
5. Tbe strong short term complementarity between defense and 
social security/welfare fades over time, with defense 
expenditures having a neutral impact on these programs. As in 
the short run periods of budgetary crisis (increases in the 
unanticipated deficit) cause the government to reduce these 
categories funding. Tbis effect is however rather weak given the 
positive (albeit low statistical significance) sign on the expected 
deficit term. 
6. Tbe short rnn patterns involving other budgetary categories 
hold up over the longer term - unexpected increases in defense 
come at the expense of these categories. Again this is offset 
somewhat by the government's willingness to expand (increase 
the unexpected deficit) the deficit to fund these activities. 
7. Finally, the negative impact of defense expenditures on 
development extends into the longer term. Tbe government does 
not appear (in the longer term) willing to expand the deficit to 
offset this effect. 
The patterns associated with development expenditures provide 
an interesting contrast to the defense related budgetary linkages 
noted above: -~0 
1. The link between interest payments and development is 
negative (as opposed to the positive one found for defense). Tbis 
impact is considerably stronger for increases in the expected 
share of the budget allocated to defense. While unanticipated 
increases in development impact negatively on interest, the size 
of the coefficient on this term is small (0.11 versus 0.82 for 
expected shares). Also the unanticipated development term is 
only marginally significant. 
2. Development expenditures are somewhat neutral in their 
affect on the share of the budget allocated to subsidies. In 
contrast to defense expenditures neither of the measures of 
development were statistically sig'lf.ificant in affecting the 
shares allocated to subsidies. 
3. Tbe patterns found for administration were fairly similar to 
that characterizing defense - administrative expenditures are 
somewhat autonomous not affected by either the capital ( devel-
opment) budget or the government's fiscal (deficit) strategy. 
4. Development expenditures also have a somewhat neutral 
link to social security/welfare payments. Here, neither of the 
measures of development's share of the budget were statisticalZy 
significant in affecting the share of these programs. 
5. As with defense, unanticipated increases in development 
expenditures tend to come at the expense of "other" programs. 
However the size of this impact is about one half of the 
magnitude associated with unanticipated increases in the size 
of the defense budgetary share. 
6. As might be expected, development and defense interact 
negatively. From the development perspective, both increases in 
the expected and unexpected budgetary shares reduce the 
share of defense in the overall budget. 
As with defense (and over time), several of the main short run 
linkages between development and other budgetary items weaken. 
In particular: 
30 Due to space limitations, the results for development and interest payments 
are not presented in detail. These results are in the same form as those Tables 1 
and 2, and are available from the author upon request. 
1. Regarding interest payments, while still negative and 
statistically sign~ficant the size of the coefficient on the 
expected budgetary share of allocations to development is 
about one half that found in the short run. 
2. The negative impact of unanticipated development 
&penditures on "other" current items holds up in the longer 
term. Again however developments in the capital budget do not 
appear to carry over in to the longer term for subsidies, 
administration, and social security. 
3. Finally the short term negative impact of development on 
defense does not extend into the longer run either. Defense 
expenditures experience a longer term distributed lag 
adjustment pattern, but development is not one of the shocks 
that affect this pattern into the medium term future. 
In summing up, the main linkages of development allocations to 
other budgetary items it appears that this category's links to the rest 
of the budget are somewhat weaker than those associated with the 
defense budget. Also of significance is that while defense impacts 
negatively on development in the longer term the reverse is not the 
case. This leads us to conclude that defense has a somewhat higher 
budgetary priority than that associated with the capital budget. 
Finally, the tradeoff patterns associated with interest payments 
provide additional insights to the government's budgetary priorities. 
In the short term: 
1. Increases in expected interest payments have a strong 
negative impact on the capital accounts. This impact is 
somewhat stronger for expected increases in interest payments. 
2. Allocations to "other" current programs are also affected 
negatively by unanticipated increases in interest payments. 
3. While defense expenditures had a short run positive impact 
on interest payments, the reverse is not the case. Tbere are no 
statistically significant links between the share (expected or 
unexpected) of the budget allocated to interest and movements 
in the relative share of the budget allocated to defense. 
4. Again, these patterns extend into the longer term with 
somewhat weaker impacts as the period is extended. Jn general 
interest payments continue· to detract from development pro-
grams. Tbere is also some evidence that social security/welfare 
payments may suffer as a result of the country's increased debt 
servicing burdens. Military expenditures, however appear 
unaffected by the country's increasing indebtedness. 
Conclusions 
While the development of a sophisticated model for analyzing 
budgetary priorities is beyond the scope of this paper, the results 
above suggest an ordering of preferences - that is, it is possible to 
roughly deduce the relative importance the Pakistani government 
attaches to each of the main budgetary categories. ·11 
The principles used here in priority ordering are stated as a 
series of self- evident rules: 
1. If one budgetary item impacts negatively on another and the 
second category does not in return impact negatively on the 
first, then the first is of higher priority. 
2. Impacts stemming from unexpected increases in a 
budgetary item reveal more about budgetary priorities than a 
corresponding change in expected magnitudes. Intuitively this 
role assumes that governments reveal their tme priorities more . 
in times of uncertainty and or emergency. 
3. Deficit changes are of less significance than budgetary share 
changes, with unexpected changes in the deficit of greater 
significance in this regard than expected changes. 
4. Long run impacts provide greater insights as to priorities 
than that obtained from an examination of shorter run 
patterns. Intuitively long run patterns reflect continuity in 
government decision making, whereas short nm patterns may 
be affected by random, exogenous events. -
Based on these rules, several general conclusions emerge from 
the empirical results presented above: 
1. Since long run defense expenditures impact negatively on 
development and development does not reduce defense over 
time, defense bas a higher priority than development. 
2. Defense has a positive short mn impact on interest payments 
with increased shares of the budget allocated to interest 
neutral (in both the short and long run) with regard to the 
share of the budget allocated to defense. Again this is a clear 
cut case of defense having the higher priority. 
31 For example, along !he lines proposed in J. Encarnacion "Some lmplicalions 
of Lexicographic U1ili1y in Development Planning·· The Philippine Economic journal<Second Semesler. 1<)70) nn J>.L"Ja() 
--j. Priorities he/ween development expenditures and interest 
payments are much more d([ficult to deduce: development 
expenditures reduce (in both the short and long run) the 
budgetary share going to interest payments. In turn, increased 
zfzterest payments reduce (again in both the short and long 
mn) the shares of the budget going to the capital account. 
4. Complicating establishment of the development/interest 
priorities is that in both cases the expected and unexpected 
deficit terms are negative - both are reduced with increases in 
the deficits. Furthermore these patterns occur in both the short 
and longer run. However, since the deficit terms are stronger 
in the case of development (together with a higher level of 
statistical significance), it appears that interest payments have 
a slightly higher priority than that afforded development. 
While the budgetary shares of the other main items of the budget 
were not directly tested against each other, it is probably safe to 
conclude that subsidies are next in priority. While they suffer from 
increased defense expenditures, they are immune from cuts due to 
expanded int~rest payments or development allocations. In 
addition the government appears willing to run higher deficits to 
fund these programs. Administration has the next highest priority -
it is immune to cuts stemming from increases in defense, interest or 
development. In addition this category does not seem to face cuts 
during periods of increased deficits. . . 
In conclusion, one may quibble over the importance of admm1s-
tration, social security/welfare and other expenditures. However, 
the overall picture of Pakistan's budgetary priorities is fairly clear. 
Defense expenditures have by far the highest priority. While the 
government may cut these programs when deficits expand more 
than anticipated, the government is inclined to cut other programs 
rather than reduce the budgetary share going to the military. 
